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PREVIEW—Murray v. BEJ Minerals, LLC:
Finding a Home for Fossils
Layne Ryerson*
The Montana Supreme Court will hear oral arguments in this
matter on Thursday, November 7, 2019 at 9:30 AM in the courtroom of
the Montana Supreme Court, Joseph P. Mazurek Building, Helena,
Montana. The Honorable Olivia Rieger will hear the case in place of
Justice Jim Rice, who recused himself. Eric B. Wolff is expected to argue
for the Appellants. Harlan B. Krogh is expected to argue for the Appellees.
I. INTRODUCTION
This case presents a unique property law issue at the center of a
long-running dispute over the ownership of multiple valuable dinosaur
fossils. As surface estate owners, Appellees claim sole ownership of the
fossils, while Appellants argue the fossils belong to the mineral estate.
After a series of appeals, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit has certified to the Montana Supreme Court the question of
“[w]hether, under Montana law, dinosaur fossils constitute ‘minerals’ for
the purpose of a mineral reservation?”1
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 2005, Jerry and Robert Severson sold the surface rights and
one-third of the mineral estate of their Garfield County ranch to Lige and
Mary Ann Murray (the “Murrays”). The Seversons and Murrays owned
the remaining two-thirds of the mineral estate as tenants-in-common.2 The
mineral deed stated that the parties would share “all right title and interest
in and to all of the oil, gas, hydrocarbons, and minerals in, on and under,
and that may be produced from the [ranch].”3 At the time of the sale,
neither party knew of or suspected the presence of dinosaur fossils on the
ranch.4
Shortly after the sale, an amateur paleontologist discovered
several valuable fossils on the ranch, including a nearly-intact
Tyrannosaurus rex skeleton, as well as the “Dueling Dinosaurs,” a twopart fossil containing a 22-foot-long theropod and a 28-foot-long
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1.
Murray v. BEJ Minerals, LLC, 924 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir.
2019) [hereinafter Certification Order].
2.
Murray v. Billings Garfield Land Co., 187 F. Supp. 3d
1203, 1205 (D. Mont. 2016) [hereinafter Murray I].
3.
Id. (citing Dep. Mary Ann Murray 30:3–31:8, Doc. 48-4 at
5–6 (2016)).
4.
Id.
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ceratopsian locked in combat.5 Experts considered the fossils (collectively
the “Montana Fossils”) highly valuable, with the Tyrannosaurus rex
skeleton fetching several million dollars from a Dutch museum.6
In 2014, the Murrays filed suit in Montana state court, seeking a
declaratory judgment that Jerry and Robert Seversons and their assignees,
BEJ Minerals, LLC and RTWF, LLC (collectively the “Seversons”), had
no interest in the Montana Fossils because they belonged to the owner of
the surface estate.7 The Seversons removed the case to federal court based
on diversity and counterclaimed, seeking reimbursement for the
ownership and sale of the Montana Fossils, which they argued were part
of the mineral estate.8
The federal district court granted summary judgment for the
Murrays, determining that the Montana Fossils did not fall within the
"ordinary and natural meaning" of the word "mineral" as used in the deed.9
The district court noted that the fossils were not mined in a traditional
sense but rather discovered by good fortune.10 Moreover, the fossils were
deemed valuable based on specimen, preservation, and species, rather than
their mineral composition.11 Finally, unlike minerals, the fossils did not
require further refinement to become valuable; their value stemmed
exclusively from their discovery.12
The Seversons appealed, and a three-judge panel of the Ninth
Circuit reversed.13 The Ninth Circuit determined that Montana had
adopted the test used by the Texas Supreme Court in Heinatz v. Allen;14
therefore, substances which are both composed of minerals and deemed
rare and exceptional belong to the mineral estate.15 Because the Montana
Fossils were technically composed of minerals and considered rare and
exceptional, the Ninth Circuit found they belonged to the mineral estate
owners.16 In response to the Ninth Circuit’s holding, the Montana
Legislature unanimously passed House Bill 229, a bill clarifying that
fossils belong to the owner of the surface estate.17

5.
Id. at 1205–06 (citing Dep. Peter Larson 131:10, Doc. 48-4
at 141 (2016)).
6.
Murray I, 187 F. Supp. 3d at 1205–07; Murray v. BEJ
Minerals, LLC, 908 F.3d 437, 441 (9th Cir. 2018) [hereinafter Murray II].
7.
Murray I, 187 F. Supp. 3d at 1207.
8.
Id. at 1212.
9.
Id.
10.
Id. at 1207.
11.
Id.
12.
Id.
13.
Murray II, 908 F.3d at 448.
14.
217 S.W.2d 994 (Tex. 1949).
15.
Murray II, 908 F. 3d at 447.
16.
Id.
17.
H.B. 229, 66th Leg. (Mont. 2019) (codified at Mont. Code Ann. §§
1–4–112, 82–1–501 (2019)).
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The Murrays petitioned for rehearing en banc, which the Ninth
Circuit granted.18 The Ninth Circuit then certified to the Montana Supreme
Court the question of “whether, under Montana law, dinosaur fossils
constitute ‘minerals’ for the purpose of a mineral reservation.”19 The Court
accepted the question but reserved the option to reformulate pending full
consideration of the issue.20
III. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
A. Appellants’ Arguments
The Seversons argue three main points. First, that the Court has
adopted the Heinatz test and should apply it on a case-by-case basis.21
Second, the passing of H.B. 229 has no bearing on the case and the Court
should not take it consideration.22 Third, the Murrays’ public policy
arguments against the inclusion of fossils in the mineral estate lack merit.23
1. Heinatz Test
The Seversons argue that the Court has already adopted the
Heinatz test and applied it on numerous occasions to determine whether a
substance qualifies as a mineral for the purposes of a mineral estate.24
Under the test, if a substance both qualifies as a mineral in the natural and
ordinary sense of the word and is deemed rare and exceptional, it belongs
to the mineral estate.25 When applying the test, however, the Seversons
urge the Court to focus on the “rare and exceptional” criteria, rather than
the “natural and ordinary” meaning, to determine mineral classification.26
The Seversons argue that the Court has never relied on dictionary or
statutory definitions to determine if a substance is a mineral.27
Next, the Seversons rely on the facts from the Ninth Circuit’s
certification order to show that the Montana Fossils qualify as minerals
under the Heinatz test.28 According to the order, the Montana Fossils are
both mineral in composition, as well as rare and valuable.29 The Seversons
dismiss the contention that the Montana Fossils were once composed of
18.

Murray v. BEJ Minerals, LLC, 920 F.3d 583 (9th Cir.

19.
20.

Certification Order, 924 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 2019).
Murray v. BEJ Minerals, LLC, 2019 WL 2383604, at *1 (Mont. June

2019).

4, 2019).
21.
Appellants’ Br. at 9, July 7, 2019, No. OP 19-0304;
Appellants’ Reply Br. at 4, Aug. 14, 2019, No. OP 19-0304
22.
Appellants’ Br. at 22–24.
23. Id. at 24–27.
24.
Id. at 9.
25.
Id.
26.
Id. at 14–15.
27.
Id.
28.
Id.
29.
Id. (citing Certification Order, 924 F.3d at 1074).
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organic matter, noting that substances like gas and oil, which are
commonly considered part of the mineral estate, also derive from living
organisms.30 Additionally, the Seversons deflect concerns that the Heinatz
test would apply to other types of bones.31 While fossils are completely
mineral in composition, bones merely contain minerals.32
The Seversons point to previous cases where the Court utilized the
Heinatz test. In Farley v. Booth Brothers Land and Livestock Company,
the Court applied the Heinatz test to scoria.33 The Court determined that
scoria was neither rare nor valuable, even though it could be sold
commercially.34 Next, in Hart v. Craig, the Court determined that
sandstone’s use in road construction did not make it rare and exceptional
for the sake of the test.35 The Seversons assert that these decisions show
the Heinatz test is established precedent in Montana and should be applied
to the Montana Fossils.36
Further, the Seversons argue that the Heinatz test appropriately
makes determinations on a case-by-case basis.37 A “sweeping categorical”
test, meanwhile, would incorrectly place value on certain minerals despite
their low quantity or difficult accessibility.38 The Seversons argue that a
case-by-case methodology will not be overly burdensome and point to
federal mining laws which also determine ownership on a situational
basis.39 According to the Seversons, the Heinatz test also provides
“predictability” because it recognizes that the purpose of a mineral estate
is to convey all valuable mineral substances to the mineral owner.40 If
parties wish to create an agreement outside this framework, they can
contract accordingly.41 Therefore, the Seversons urge the Court to observe
stare decisis and continue applying the Heinatz test to determine what
constitutes a mineral.42
Additionally, the Seversons suggest the Court reformulate the
certified question as allowed under the Ninth Circuit’s certification
order.43 The Seversons argue the Court cannot properly answer the
question posed because dinosaur fossils in general do not meet or fail the
Heinatz test.44 Accordingly, the Seversons maintain that the proper

30.
Appellants’ Reply Br. at 21.
31.
Id.
32.
Id. at 6.
33.
890 P.2d at 378.
34.
Appellants’ Br. at 9 (citing Farley v. Booth Bros. Land &
Livestock Co., 890 P.2d 377, 380 (Mont. 1995)).
35.
Id. (citing Hart v. Craig, 216 P.3d 197 (Mont. 2009).
36.
Id.
37.
Id.
38.
Id. at 17.
39.
Id.
40.
Id. at 19.
41.
Id.
42.
Id. at 20.
43.
Id. at 4 (citing Certification Order, 924 F.3d at 1074).
44.
Id. at 3.

2019 PREVIEW: MURRAY V. BEJ MINERALS, LLC

5

analysis of a fossil’s mineral or non-mineral designation must be specific
to the particular fossil.45
2. Montana’s Legislative Fix
Shortly after the Ninth Circuit’s decision, Montana enacted
legislation to “clarify [that] dinosaur bones and fossils are part of surface
estate.”46 The Seversons note that while the statute applies retroactively, it
does not apply to pending litigation; therefore, it should have no bearing
on the Court’s decision.47 Moreover, the Seversons argue that the statute
says nothing about the parties’ original intended allocation of the mineral
estate nor their use of the word “mineral.”48
3. Policy Concerns
Finally, the Seversons contend that the public policy arguments
presented by the Murrays and their amici are unfounded and undermined
by the new statute.49 One major concern raised by the opposition involved
the impact to museum ownership of fossils.50 The Seversons argued that
this perceived problem could only occur under a specific five-part series
of events that, to date, has never been an issue.51 Additionally, Montana’s
two-year statute of limitations would also greatly mitigate such concerns.52
Second, the Seversons claim that recognizing valuable fossils as
minerals would not hamper paleontological research.53 The Seversons
compare fossil exploration to that of oil and gas, which is not impeded by
the need to acquire permission from both mineral and surface estate
owners.54 Finally, the Seversons counter the argument that the “rare and
exceptional” distinction is unworkable.55 They point to Farley, where the
Court used the distinction to show that sand and limestone could either
pass or fail the Heinatz test depending on their specific qualities.56
Accordingly, the Seversons submit that dinosaur fossils should be treated
no differently than fossil fuels for the sake of ownership.57

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id. at 4.
Mont. Code Ann. § 1–4–112 (2019).
Appellants’ Reply Br. at 16.
Id.
Appellants’ Br., at 24.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 25.
Id.
Id. at 26.
Id. (citing Farley, 890 P.2d at 381).
Id.
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B. Appellees’ Argument
The Murrays respond with three main points. First, the Court must
not view the certified question as applying specifically to the Montana
Fossils, and thus should deem all fossils as non-mineral.58 Second, the
Court should consider H.B. 229 as indicative of what Montanans consider
to qualify as minerals, and rule accordingly.59 Third, including fossils in
the mineral estate would have dangerous public policy ramifications.60
1. Heinatz Test
The Murrays first question Montana’s adoption of the Heinatz
test. They argue the Seversons misstated relevant Montana mineral law by
asserting that the Farley Court adopted the Heinatz test.61 Instead, they
argue the Farley Court began by looking at the statutory classification of
scoria, and only looked to other jurisdictions because of inconsistent
statutory definitions.62 Furthermore, the Murray’s assert that the Farley
Court merely mentioned the “rare and exceptional test,” but did not apply
it.63 Additionally, the Murrays state that since deeds are interpreted like
contracts, the Court should look solely at the four corners of the
document.64 Therefore, dinosaur fossils should not be included, since they
are not expressly mentioned in the mineral deed.65
To the extent Montana has adopted the Heinatz test, the Murrays
alternatively argue that it requires the substance to have been “specifically
. . . defined as a ‘mineral’ under applicable Montana statute.”66 If doubt
remains whether the material is considered a “mineral,” the Murrays argue
that the Court should apply the “rare and exceptional test.”67 Because
fossils have never been considered a mineral in any common parlance or
technical sense, the Murrays contend the Court should not advance to the
rare and exceptional analysis.68
The Murrays also point to an additional factor mentioned in
Heinatz: the impact of mineral excavation on the surrounding landscape.69
Much like the limestone at issue in Heinatz, fossil discovery requires the
excavator to follow fragments and scrape away the surface of the land.70

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
(Tex. 1949)).
70.

Appellees’ Br. at 9, July 31, 2019, No. OP 19-0304.
Id. at 2.
Id.
Id. at 9 (citing Farley, 890 P.2d at 380).
Id. at 9.
Id. at 24.
Id. (citing Mont. Code Ann. § 82–4–303(9) (2019)).
Id. at 10.
Id.
Id. at 17.
Id. at 14.
Id. at 15 (citing Heinatz v. Allen, 217 S.W.2d 994, 1000
Id.

2019 PREVIEW: MURRAY V. BEJ MINERALS, LLC

7

Therefore, the Murrays urge the Court to consider the significant impact
of fossil extraction on the surface estate.71
Next, the Murrays disagree that the “rare and exceptional test” can
apply to a specific object within a class of substances.72 They state that the
test cannot operate in isolation; therefore, the Court must look at all fossils
when making a decision.73 Further, they state that no court has ever looked
at an individual substance or subset and determined that it met the rare and
exceptional test.74
The Murrays then propose a “true test” for determining if
substances qualify as minerals.75 This test looks at what “mineral” is
understood to mean in the vernacular of the resource extraction industry,
commercial world, and specific landowners.76 The Montana Fossils would
fail under such a test, since fossils have never been understood by the
resource extraction industry, commercial world, or landowners to
constitute minerals.77
Finally, the Murrays critique the Seversons’ representation of the
Ninth Circuit’s certification order.78 The certified question asks if fossils,
in general, are part of the mineral estate.79 This contradicts the Seversons’
argument that the Montana Fossils deserve a focused analysis.
Accordingly, the Murrays argue that the Court’s analysis should apply to
all dinosaur fossils, regardless of their value.80
2. Montana’s Legislative Fix
While the Murrays concede that H.B. 229 has no bearing on the
case, they note the unanimous support for the legislation indicates the will
of the Montana people.81 Further, the Murrays argue widespread support
for the law demonstrates that Montanans have never considered dinosaur
fossils part of the mineral estate.82
3. Impact on Precedent
Lastly, the Murrays urge the Court to observe the potential public
policy impacts of their ruling.83 While the Court’s decision will not impact
71.
Id. at 15–16.
72.
Id. at 24–25.
73.
Id. at 25.
74.
Id.
75.
Id. (citing Mack Oil Co. v. Laurence, 389 P.2d 955 (Okla.
1964) (holding that sub-surface water was not intended to be conveyed under
the transfer of the mineral estate)).
76.
Id.
77.
Id.
78.
Id. at 30–31.
79.
Id. (citing Certification Order, 924 F.3d at 1074)..
80.
Id.
81.
Id. at 35.
82.
Id.
83.
Id.
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Montana law, it may be followed by other states without legislation
addressing dinosaur fossils and mineral rights.84 Furthermore, the Murrays
note the impracticality of the rare and exceptional test, stating that many
fossils require significant excavation before their value can be
determined.85 Accordingly, it would be impractical to create a distinction
between mineral and non-mineral fossils.86
IV. ANALYSIS
The Court will likely apply the natural and ordinary test to
determine that dinosaur fossils are not minerals for the sake of a mineral
estate. The parties do not contest that fossils are composed of Francolite
and that Francolite is properly classified as a mineral.87 But the mere
presence of minerals in a substance does not satisfy the natural and
ordinary test; otherwise all dirt and water would qualify as a mineral.
Montana law expressly permits the use of statutory and dictionary
definitions to determine the ordinary meaning of a contract term.88
Therefore, the Court will likely consider these definitions of the term
“mineral” to determine if fossils qualify for the sake of the Severson
mineral estate. The result of such consideration will yield that no Montana
or federal statutory definition includes dinosaur fossils within the meaning
of “mineral” in any context.89
Moreover, there is a critical distinction between this situation and
Farley. In Farley, the Court first looked at the statutory classification of
scoria and, finding that it was expressly included in one definition of
mineral and ambiguous in another, the Court chose to continue to the rare
and exceptional analysis.90 Here, the Court will likely view the absence of
statutory and dictionary definitions of “fossils” as evidence that fossils fall
outside the natural and ordinary meaning of the term mineral.
If the Court determines that fossils are minerals in a natural and
ordinary sense, they will likely grant the Seversons’ request to reformulate
the certified question.91 The “rare and exceptional” language from Heinatz
requires that the Court look at a specific object within a category of
substances. Despite the Murrays’ argument that the test should apply
categorically to all fossils, prior cases demonstrate a clear intent for noncategorical application. Heinatz held that in order for common substances
like limestone and sand to become valuable they must contain unique
attributes, such as a conducive composition for making glass or cement.92
84.
Id.
85.
Id.
86.
Id. at 37–38.
87.
Appellants’ Br. at 7.
88.
Appellees’ Br. at 20–21 (citing Ravalli County. v. Erickson,
85 P.3d 772, 774 (Mont. 2004)).
89.
Murray I, 187 F. Supp. 3d at 1205.
90.
Farley, 890 P.2d at 379.
91.
Appellants’ Reply Br. at 4.
92.
Heinatz, 217 S.W.2d at 997.
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Further, the Farley Court held that sand is typically not rare or exceptional
but can qualify if it is valuable for making glass.93 The majority opinion
from Murray II clarified that the Farley Court obviously intended for the
Heinatz test to be applied non-categorically, and for the outcome to be
dependent on the rare and valuable nature of the particular substance.94 If
the Court chooses to apply the Heinatz test non-categorically, specifically
focusing on the Montana Fossils, there is no question that they would
satisfy the rare and exceptional requirement. Therefore, if the Court
determines that fossils are minerals in a natural and ordinary sense, it will
likely reformulate the certified question and rule in favor of the Seversons.
The Court will also likely consider the public policy concerns
raised by the parties. Despite the Seversons’ claim to the contrary, fossil
exploration differs vastly from that of oil and gas.95 Clayton Phipps, the
amateur paleontologist who initially discovered the Montana Fossils,
admits that finding fossils is unscientific and mostly a matter of luck.96
Fossil discovery primarily involves “walking, riding, or driving around to
see if there are any bones lying around or sticking out of the ground.” 97
Given Montana’s heightened sense of privacy, unfettered exploration
would be problematic. Unrestrained exploration could run counter to the
property rights recognized by Montana, particularly the implied covenant
of quiet enjoyment.
The Court may also consider the potential disruption that could
occur from a fossil dig. The Heinatz Court excluded limestone from the
mineral estate primarily due to impacts from the extraction process.98 Like
limestone strip mining, fossil excavations can include many individuals
and encompass hundreds of acres. Such disruptions would interfere with
farmers and ranchers who depend on their land for their livelihood. While
surface estate owners would be entitled to compensation under Montana
statute, many Montana landowners would likely find that this type of
lifestyle interference cannot be satisfied by monetary damages.
V. CONCLUSION
Given the existing case precedent and public policy ramifications,
the Court will likely conclude that the Montana Fossils properly belong to
the Murrays. While the holding of this case may not impact Montana law
regarding fossil ownership, it may establish useful jurisprudence for
surrounding states that have not yet passed an applicable statute. However,
the Court’s decision will nonetheless greatly impact the two families who
stand to gain considerable wealth or be left with nothing.

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Farley, 890 P.2d at 380.
Murray II, 908 F.3d at 447 (citing Farley, 890 P.2d at 380).
Appellants’ Br. at 26.
Murray I, 187 F. Supp. 3d at 1207.
Id.
Heinatz, 217 S.W.2d at 997.

